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Religious Freedom, Human Rights, and Peaceful 
Coexistence 
Leslie C. Griffin* 
At the Second Vatican Council, Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., 
persuaded the Catholic Church to abandon its long, and absolute, opposition 
to the separation of church and state. He brought a new concept of religious 
freedom to the Catholic Church. In honor of Murray, this essay looks at 
several current ways “religious freedom” harms individual rights. 
The article describes the ministerial exception, which gives religious 
organizations the right to dismiss many employment discrimination lawsuits 
brought against them. It studies women’s right to contraceptive access, 
which has long been opposed by the Catholic hierarchy, and where 
employers have earned a legal right not to offer women contraceptive 
insurance. And it looks at LGBTs’ right to marry, which has received 
constant opposition from the church, even after the Supreme Court legalized 
it. 
These three topics give us reason to reconsider how much religious 
freedom religious institutions should enjoy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of our country’s constitutional history, people 
“believed that the individual, not the state or the church, should decide 
matters of faith.”1 Unfortunately, today the state’s actors have 
 
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, UNLV Boyd School of Law. Many thanks to Professor 
Miguel Díaz for organizing this conference, and to Marci Hamilton, Paige Foley, and Teri 
Greenman for comments on this paper. 
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(2003) (emphasis added). 
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empowered church institutions while neglecting individuals. Religious 
institutions have become places where constitutional and statutory legal 
rights are lost, without a penalty to the offending institution or any benefit 
to the individual. 
Religious freedom is causing happiness in some institutions but sorrow 
to many individuals. Women, the aged, the disabled, and LGBTs are 
repeatedly fired by religious institutions.2 Employees lack any chance to 
go to court under a legal doctrine called the ministerial exception.3 
Employers often legally limit women’s reproductive freedom.4 LGBTs 
face numerous religious blocks to their new constitutional right to marry.5 
Many people defend such situations as a great victory for the First 
Amendment and the institutions’ religious freedom. In my view, 
however, the individuals are too often forgotten. 
This situation is reminiscent of John Courtney Murray’s career. 
Murray was the priest whose brilliant work is the focus of this conference. 
During Murray’s lifetime, the Roman Catholic Church taught that 
separation of church and state was sinful and always wrong.6 The church 
completely opposed the principles of the First Amendment.7 After a 
lifetime of opposition and silencing from his church, Murray eventually 
persuaded the Second Vatican Council to view the American situation 
more favorably, and to recognize that every individual has the right to 
religious freedom.8 My hope is that current-day Murrays will eventually 
persuade all religions to accept their members’ constitutional and 
statutory rights instead of opposing them. 
Part I of this paper identifies why Murray’s work was unique and 
brilliant. Parts II, III, and IV identify three areas where religious freedom 
limits individuals’ rights. Part II describes the ministerial exception. Part 
III explores women’s rights to contraceptive access. Part IV examines 
LGBTs’ rights to marry. The Conclusion explains why things should be 
different, one day. 
I.  THE LEGACY OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY 
For some of us, there is no Catholic who can match the experience and 
accomplishment of John Courtney Murray. He confronted an irresolvable 
problem and nonetheless solved it. Faced with church teaching that said 
 
2. See infra Part II. 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part III. 
5. See infra Part IV. 
6. See infra Part I. 
7. See infra Part I. 
8. See infra Part I. 
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Roman Catholicism must always be the established church of every 
nation because error has no rights,9 Murray’s teaching about the United 
States eventually persuaded the church to adopt a much broader notion of 
religious freedom—namely, that it is everyone’s individual right.10 
Murray’s work influenced our first—and still only—Catholic 
president, John Fitzgerald Kennedy.11 Time magazine put Murray on its 
cover after Kennedy’s election in recognition of the intellectual work he 
had done to demonstrate that Catholics could be American citizens, 
politicians, and presidents.12 Kennedy is now criticized by Republicans 
and Democrats for being too strict a separationist between church and 
state.13 Nonetheless, Murray and Kennedy had a message that people like 
me—or should I say women like me?—still find valuable. 
First, let us remember why Murray was so important and unique in the 
Catholic world. 
During the 1940s, Catholics were struggling with the problem of 
“intercredal cooperation,” where people of different faiths were 
collaborating in social justice work after World War II. Intercredal 
cooperation sounds like a great thing, especially today, but Catholics back 
then were troubled that working with different religions could lead 
followers to lose their belief that their religion was true.14 And 
Catholicism was the only true religion.15 
Murray proposed a solution to this difficulty, namely that members of 
 
9. See John Courtney Murray, Religious Freedom, in FREEDOM AND MAN 131, 134–35 (J.C. 
Murray ed., 1965) (describing the church’s teachings that Catholicism is the only true religion).  
10. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, Declaration on Religious Freedom para. 7 (Dec. 7, 
1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_ 
19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html [hereinafter Dignitatis Humanae]. 
11. The Religious Affiliations of U.S. Presidents, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 15, 2009), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2009/01/15/the-religious-affiliations-of-us-presidents/. 
12. Boris Chaliapin, John Courtney Murray, TIME (Dec. 12, 1960), http://content.time.com/ 
time/covers/0,16641,19601212,00.html; To Be Catholic and American, TIME (Dec. 12, 1960), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,871923,00.html. 
13. See R. Albert Mohler Jr., My Take: Santorum’s Right, JFK Wrong on Separation of Church 
and State, BELIEF BLOG (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/29/my-
take-santorums-right-jfk-wrong-on-separation-of-church-and-state/ (Quoting Rick Santorum 
stating, “The idea that the church can have no influence or no involvement in the operation of the 
state is absolutely antithetical to the objectives and vision of our country.”); Joan Frawley 
Desmond, Was JFK Right to Uphold an ‘Absolute’ Separation of Church and State?, NAT’L CATH. 
REG. (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/was-jfk-right-to-uphold-an-absolute-
separation-of-church-and-state (Quoting Robert Kraynak who said “Santorum was largely correct 
about Kennedy’s speech being disturbing and even embarrassing for Catholics . . . .”). 
14. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR: SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J. 4 (J. Leon Hooper, S.J. ed., 1994); J. LEON HOOPER, 
S.J., THE ETHICS OF DISCOURSE: THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY 14 
(1986). 
15. John Courtney Murray, Christian Co-operation, 3 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 413, 414 (1942). 
80 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  50 
all religions could find common ground in the natural law, even while 
disagreeing about their religions.16 The natural law provides common 
principles to all human persons of different religious beliefs.17 Murray 
later explained how different religious groups could work together for 
peace. In contrast, his contemporary theologians were not as 
accommodating and opposed much intercredal cooperation. They did not 
want people from different religions to work together.18 They wanted to 
protect the truth from any threat in any circumstances. 
Unlike other Catholics of his era, Murray accepted religious pluralism, 
especially in the United States. At the same time, he insisted that 
Catholicism is true.19 Even at this early date, Murray recognized that 
Catholics, especially American Catholics, live within a “religiously 
pluralistic” world.20 In his words, “Whether we like it or not, we are 
living in a religiously pluralist society at a time of spiritual crisis; and the 
alternatives are the discovery of social unity, or destruction.”21 Catholics, 
he wrote, must be taught to understand the grounds on which they 
cooperate and to understand that such cooperation is not inconsistent with 
their faith in the one true church.22 
Faced with difficult problems, Murray was very practical—like 
lawyers should be. And that is one main reason why this lawyer admires 
him. Murray acknowledged frankly—and practically—that “Catholic 
social action alone, for all its intrinsic resources, is simply not up to the 
enormity of the task that confronts it with frightening urgency.”23 
Murray became very sophisticated in explaining how people of 
different faiths could live together: 
(1) we can reach an important measure of agreement on the ethical 
plane; (2) we must agree to disagree on the theological plane; (3) but 
we can reach harmony of action and mutual confidence on the political 
plane, in virtue of the agreement previously established on the ethical 
 
16. Id. at 418. 
17. Id. at 430. 
18. MURRAY, supra note 14, at 4. 
19. Murray, supra note 15, at 414. 
20. John Courtney Murray, Co-operation: Some Further Views, 4 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 100, 
100 (1943). 
21. John Courtney Murray, Intercredal Co-operation: Its Theory and Its Organization, 4 
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 257, 274 (1943). 
22. Id. at 275 (“[E]very affirmation of human nature, insofar as it is an affirmation, puts one on 
the way to Christ.”). 
23. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., The Pattern for Peace and the Papal Peace Program, in 
BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, 
S.J. 6, 14 (J. Leon Hooper, S.J. ed., 1994). 
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plane, as well as in virtue of a shared concern for the common good of 
the political community, international and national.24 
This was one of Murray’s most practical lessons: People of different 
religions find common ground in the political plane.25 Agreement looks 
possible but more difficult on the ethical plane.26 And—do not forget—
there is no agreement on theology. There we just have to agree to 
disagree.27 
It was one thing for Catholics to work with non-Catholics in social 
organizations, or in groups committed to social reform, but quite another 
for Catholics and non-Catholics to cooperate in political society, and 
specifically in the state. Murray identified politics as common ground for 
different religious individuals,28 but this argument had serious 
implications for the institutional relationship of church to state. As he 
developed his account of the Catholic relationship to the state, Murray 
battled both liberals and Catholics.29 
In 1954, Rome ordered him to stop writing about church and state. In 
a letter, Murray wrote,  
All the books on Church and State and on allied topics have been 
cleared from my room, in symbol of retirement, which I expect to be 
permanent. When Frank Sheed returns, I shall cancel the agreement I 
had with him to edit and revise the articles on Church and State for a 
book. Fortunately, my gloomy prescience impelled me to refuse an 
invitation to give the Walgreen Lectures at the U. of Chicago. And all 
other practical measures will be taken to close the door on the past ten 
years, leaving all their mistakenesses to God.30 
He began to send his manuscripts to Rome for approval before 
publication, which was at times denied.31 
In their formal language, many Catholic writers in Murray’s age 
believed that the thesis is church establishment; the hypothesis is non-
establishment.32 The thesis is good; the hypothesis is evil. Thesis, 
hypothesis. A non-Catholic state (like the United States) was the 
“hypothesis” that had to be tolerated as an evil.33 Catholics could tolerate 
 
24. John Courtney Murray, Freedom of Religion: I. The Ethical Problem, 6 THEOLOGICAL 
STUD. 229, 239–40 (1945). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Paul Hanly Furfey, To the Editor, 4 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 467, 471 (1943). 
30. DONALD E. PELOTTE, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY: THEOLOGIAN IN CONFLICT 53 (1976). 
31. Id. at 52–53. 
32. Murray, supra note 9, at 134–35. 
33. John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: On Religious Freedom, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 
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the hypothesis, but were obligated to change the hypothesis to thesis 
when they could do so.34 The slogan connected to this theory was “error 
has no rights.”35 True religion, Catholicism, had rights to public worship, 
but other—false—religions did not.36 This slogan was significant for the 
question of public worship. It meant that Catholics in the minority and 
the majority clearly have the right to public worship; their religion is true. 
But error does not have “rights” to public worship.37 Consequently, non-
Catholics in the majority and the minority should not have the right to 
public worship. But true Catholics should.38 
If the thesis/hypothesis dichotomy is the correct account of Roman 
Catholic church-state theory, then the separation of church and state is 
clearly wrong, an evil to be tolerated, and changed whenever it can be. 
John F. Kennedy’s advisors consulted with Murray as Kennedy faced 
those charges in his presidential campaign and as he prepared his famous 
address to the Houston ministers.39 Murray argued that Catholic 
participation in the United States was not the toleration of an evil, but 
“has been a matter of conscience and conviction, because its motive was 
not expediency in the narrow sense—the need to accept what one is 
powerless to change.”40 The church’s teaching about the state, he wrote, 
must reflect historical change.41 Murray argued that the thesis is the 
freedom of the church, not the establishment of the church.42 
And he amazingly won that battle at the Second Vatican Council in 
1965. In Dignitatis Humanae,43 the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 
the church acknowledged that religious freedom is “the right of the 
person.”44 Not just the right of Catholics. The right of everyone. Back at 
home, Murray wrote that the First Amendment is not “articles of faith;” 
 
409, 420 (1949). 
34. Murray, supra note 9, at 134–35. 
35. Id. at 134. 
36. Id. at 134–35. 
37. Id. 
38. RICHARD P. MCBRIEN, THE HARPERCOLLINS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLICISM 662, 1233 
(Richard P. McBrien ed., 1995) (describing “indifferentism” and “Syllabus of Errors”). 
39. PELOTTE, supra note 30, at 76; Address of Senator John F. Kennedy to the Greater Houston 
Ministerial Association, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Sept. 12, 1960), 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ALL6YEBJMEKYGMCntnSCvg.aspx. 
40. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON 
THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 43 (1960). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 10. 
44. Id. See Murray, supra note 9, at 134–35 (discussing the church teaching that Roman 
Catholicism must always be the established religion of each nation). 
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it does not assert a theological truth.45 Catholics support the First 
Amendment as “articles of peace.”46 Articles of peace, not articles of 
faith. 
Murray later relied upon a prudential aspect of the law to argue that the 
church should not oppose the decriminalization of contraception in 
Massachusetts law.47 Murray’s essay on contraception was written before 
Humanae Vitae, the 1968 encyclical letter that reiterated the church’s 
traditional ban on artificial contraception. 48 Humanae Vitae was greeted 
with dissent and disobedience by lay Catholics, who then, and now, use 
contraceptives in numbers similar to other religious and nonreligious 
American women.49 Nonetheless, American Catholic officials rely on the 
encyclical to block individual Catholics from making their own decisions 
about contraceptive use. Murray did not question the church’s teaching 
to Catholics.50 Catholics should affirm the ban on contraception as a 
matter of private morality but should not enforce this ban as a matter of 
law.51 In Murray’s eyes, it was difficult to see how the state can forbid, 
as contrary to public morality, a practice that numerous religious leaders 
approve as morally right.52 In a pluralistic society, a minority must not 
impose its comprehensive views as law. Enforcing a religion on one’s 
fellow citizens would be illegal coercion. 
John Courtney Murray died in 1967, before Pope Paul VI issued his 
encyclical letter, Humanae Vitae, prohibiting artificial contraception in 
1968, and before the Supreme Court’s abortion decision in Roe v. 
Wade.53 Murray did not live to join the ecclesial debate about 
 
45. MURRAY, supra note 40, at 49. 
46. Id. 
47. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., Memo to Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation, 
in BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN COURTNEY 
MURRAY, S.J. 81–86 (J. Leon Hooper, S.J. ed., 1994). 
48. Encyclical Letter from Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (July 25, 1968), 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-
vitae.html [hereinafter Humanae Vitae]. 
49. Contraceptive Use in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 2018), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/contraceptive-use-united-states#6. 
50. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., Appendix: Toledo Talk, in BRIDGING THE SACRED 
AND THE SECULAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J. 334, 336 (J. Leon 
Hooper, S.J. ed., 1994) (On birth control, “[t]he church reached for too much certainty too soon, it 
went too far. Certainty was reached in the absence of any adequate understanding of marriage. This, 
many would hold—I would hold—is today no longer theologically tenable. . . . It is also 
psychologically untenable.”); MURRAY, supra note 47, at 81–86 (discussing the encyclical letter 
reiterating the church’s traditional ban on artificial contraception). 
51. MURRAY, supra note 47, at 81–86. 
52. Id. 
53. Humanae Vitae, supra note 48 (Pope Paul VI’s encyclical letter condemning contraception); 
see generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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contraception that consumed Catholics after the pope’s ban. Murray, who 
had written so extensively about religious pluralism, did not survive to 
address today’s significant questions of moral pluralism among 
Americans about the morality of employment discrimination, 
contraception, and marriage. In contrast, today the United States 
government frequently interprets religious freedom to protect institutions 
and ignores the interests of religious individuals even when their 
constitutional rights are at stake. 
Reading Murray from a constitutional lawyer’s perspective, three 
powerful points are present in his arguments. First, the right to religious 
freedom belongs to every human individual, not just to the individual 
church or just to Catholics.54 Second, people of different faiths can find 
political common ground even while agreeing to disagree about 
theology.55 Third, the established church is not a valid legal or political 
ideal.56 
We could still profit in the United States if we followed those three 
principles today. But many of Murray’s successors, both Catholic and 
non-Catholic, in courts, legislatures, and voting booths, have instead 
remained overwhelmingly committed to their own religious truth instead 
of to everyone’s religious rights. Some people maintain their religious 
freedom while many people lose it and other constitutional rights to 
equality and liberty. 
Murray’s point that the right to religious freedom belongs to the 
individual was an important idea in the early United States.57 “The 
American Revolution broke many of the intimate ties that had 
traditionally linked religion and government, . . . and turned religion into 
a voluntary affair, a matter of individual free choice.”58 Americans of that 
era—and since—broke away from traditional religious organizations and 
pursued individual liberty. They “believed that the individual, not the 
state or the church, should decide matters of faith.”59 The Establishment 
 
54. See Murray, supra note 9, at 134–35 (detailing Murray’s position on religious freedom, 
arguing that the First Amendment is not “articles of faith;” and it does not assert a theological truth). 
55. Murray, supra note 24, at 6 (discussing Murray’s belief that people of different religious 
faiths should live together in the same nation). 
56. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text (examining tension in Roman Catholic 
beliefs between religious freedom and the Catholic right to public worship). 
57. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, 
at 576 (2009) (“The American Revolution broke many of the intimate ties that had traditionally 
linked religion and government, . . . and turned religion into a voluntary affair, a matter of individual 
choice.”). 
58. Id. 
59. LAMBERT, supra note 1, at 180 (emphasis added). 
2018]  Peaceful Coexistence 85 
Clause was supposed to limit churches as well as states.60 The 
combination of church and state was troubling because both 
organizations could, and still do, harm individuals. Some people realized 
that when the Declaration on Religious Freedom was adopted.61 
As Murray noted, regardless of whether Catholics liked it, the United 
States was a “religiously pluralist society at a time of spiritual crisis,” and 
the alternatives were either to accept it and unify as a society or to fail as 
one.62 If we continue to build a political system where constitutional 
rights consistently lose to religious freedom, we are bound to destroy, 
instead of build, our political order. Today, churches need more Murrays, 
who have the courage to dissent from and then change their church’s 
teaching on important constitutional rights. Father Joseph Fenton once 
wrote about Murray:  
In the event that Fr. Murray’s teaching is true . . . then it would seem 
that our students of sacred theology and of public ecclesiastical law 
have been sadly deceived for the past few centuries. . . . It is hard to 
believe that any Catholic could be convinced that an entire section of 
Catholic teaching about the Church itself could be so imperfect.63 
Yet, Murray was right and still provides an example to follow. He is a 
great model of slowly effectuating change in favor of rights in a rights-
unfriendly world. Just as Murray fought successfully for religious 
freedom, today women and LGBTs need to convince both church and 
state that they have rights. The next three sections describe how 
employment discrimination law, contraception law, and same-sex 
marriage are limited today by religious freedom.64 
II.  EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the federal employment 
discrimination law, protects individuals from employment discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.65 Congress 
 
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
61. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 10. 
62. Murray, supra note 21, at 274. 
63. BARRY HUDOCK, STRUGGLE, CONDEMNATION, VINDICATION: JOHN COURTNEY 
MURRAY’S JOURNEY TOWARD VATICAN II 170 (2015). 
64. See infra Parts II, III, and IV. 
65. In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination by public and 
private employers on the basis of religion. According to Title VII, 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
or  
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
86 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  50 
anticipated the question whether the application of Title VII to religious 
organizations constitutes unconstitutional government interference in 
religious practice. Accordingly, they passed the following exemption 
from religious discrimination lawsuits for religious organizations that 
hire on the basis of religion: “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a 
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”66 
The wording of the statute, moreover, raised many additional questions 
for religious institutions. Religious leaders did not want churches to be 
liable for racial or sexual discrimination if it accords with their beliefs. 
They did not want a church to be liable for sex discrimination if it refuses 
to treat women equally, racial discrimination if it refuses to hire African 
Americans, or sexual orientation discrimination if it fires LGBTs. 
Religious administrators also wanted the exemption to extend to all 
employment at church-run institutions, from janitors to clergy. They 
wanted all religious organizations, from the local mosque to the YMCA, 
to be protected from discrimination suits.67 
Time favored the institutions’ leaders over the individual members. 
The statute clearly prohibits religious institutions from discriminating 
based on gender, race, color, and national origin without exemption.68 
Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly ruled that the First Amendment’s 
“ministerial exception” dismisses many Title VII suits against 
employers.69 If an employee is a minister, an employer may win because 
of this affirmative defense.70 The ministerial exception also applies to 
other state and federal discrimination, contract, and tort lawsuits.71 
Since 1972, every court in the United States has recognized the 
 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a). 
67. Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption 
from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 2000 (2007); Laura L. Coon, Note, 
Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the Constitutional 
Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481, 483 
(2001). 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)–(2). 
69. See infra notes 73–88 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC). 
70. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012). 
71. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the expanding ministerial exception 
achieved through various case holdings). 
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exception, culminating with the Supreme Court’s decision affirming its 
validity in 2012.72 The Fifth Circuit created the ministerial exception in 
1972 when it dismissed Mrs. Billie McClure’s equal pay lawsuit against 
the Salvation Army.73 After that, federal and state courts repeatedly 
expanded the exception to reject lawsuits by elementary and secondary 
school teachers, school principals, university professors, music teachers, 
choir directors, organists, administrators, administrative secretaries, 
communications managers, and public relations personnel alleging 
violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Title VII, the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the 
Family & Medical Leave Act, workers’ compensation laws, and 
numerous state tort and contract laws.74 
The Supreme Court confirmed the wisdom of those cases in Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.75 Cheryl Perich 
was an elementary school teacher at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School, a K–8 school in Redford, Michigan.76 The 
school’s personnel manuals stated that she, like any other schoolteacher, 
was protected by employment discrimination laws.77 As the 2004–05 
school year approached, Perich suddenly and unexpectedly became ill.78 
 
72. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
73. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 561 (5th Cir. 1972). 
74. See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(director of the Department of Religious Formation could not bring an Equal Pay Act claim); 
Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010) (seminarian 
could not bring state minimum wage claim); McCants v. Ala.-W. Fla. Conference of United 
Methodist Church, Inc., 372 F. App’x 39 (11th Cir. 2010) (African American pastor could not bring 
§ 1981 race and retaliation claim); Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(rabbi’s breach of contract claim dismissed); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(priest could not bring Title VII racial discrimination claim); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 
294 (3d Cir. 2006) (college chaplain could not bring Title VII sex discrimination claim); Tomic v. 
Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) (music director could not bring ADEA 
claim), abrogated by Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171; Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 
320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003) (Hispanic communications manager could not bring Title VII national 
origin claim); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (choirmaster’s ADA claim 
dismissed); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 
1999) (former clergy member could not bring pregnancy discrimination claim); Ross v. Metro. 
Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (director of Worship Arts (music director) 
barred from bringing § 1981 claim); Fassl v. Our Lady of Perpetual Help Roman Catholic Church, 
No. 05-CV-0404, 2005 WL 2455253 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2005) (director of music precluded from 
bringing FMLA suit); Malichi v. Archdiocese of Miami, 945 So. 2d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(priest could not bring state workers’ compensation claim). 
75. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
76. Id. at 177–78. 
77. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 
2010), rev’d, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
78. Id. at 773. 
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When she tried to return to class from disability leave, the school 
suggested that she voluntarily resign.79 Perich refused and was fired after 
she threatened to talk to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) about a disabilities discrimination lawsuit.80 She then sued 
Hosanna-Tabor under the antiretaliation provisions of the ADA, claiming 
they had retaliated against her for being disabled.81 
The Supreme Court unanimously denied Perich her day in court. In 
Hosanna-Tabor, the Court ruled that the First Amendment requires the 
ministerial exception to dismiss employment lawsuits.82 In practice, the 
ministerial exception is a court-created doctrine holding that the First 
Amendment requires the dismissal of many employment discrimination 
cases against religious employers, even when the antidiscrimination 
statutes authorize litigation.83 Many Catholic women have had their 
lawsuits dismissed even though their church never ordains women, 
making it implausible that women employees are actually ministers.84 In 
the long run, constitutional rights are weakened if their biggest opponents 
have the legal right to oppose and undermine them. Human rights and 
peaceful coexistence are protected only if we go beyond where Murray 
went in his day and stop the churches from having so much freedom to 
limit the legal rights of their disagreeing members. 
Pre-Hosanna-Tabor, a Catholic school principal fired Madeline 
Weishuhn for reporting to state authorities that she thought a student’s 
friend was being sexually abused.85 Although state law required 
Weishuhn to report abuse, Michigan state courts dismissed her 
whistleblower’s lawsuit based on the ministerial exception.86 Now, with 
Hosanna-Tabor on the books, courts continue to dismiss lawsuits against 
religious institutions. The Kentucky Supreme Court, for example, 
allowed a tenured Jewish professor of Jewish Studies who taught 
academic courses about the history of religion to sue Lexington 
 
79. Id. at 774. 
80. Id. at 774–75. 
81. Id. at 775. 
82. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194 (2012). 
83. Id. 
84. See, e.g., Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2017); Brazauskas v. Fort 
Wayne-S. Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2003); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese 
of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003). 
85. See generally Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 787 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2010); see also Supreme Court Considers Whistleblower Protection for “Ministerial Employees,” 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION BLOG (Mar. 28, 2011), https://www.whistleblowersblog.org/ 
2011/03/articles/corporate-whistleblowers/supreme-court-considers-whistleblower-protection-for-
ministerial-employees/. 
86. Weishuhn, 787 N.W.2d at 522. 
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Theological Seminary, but the court did not allow a Methodist Episcopal 
Church pastor and teacher who taught religious courses at the seminary 
and occasionally preached there to sue the same seminary.87 
Some Catholic schools have recently fired numerous employees, 
especially openly gay and lesbian schoolteachers who became more 
visible after same-sex marriage became a constitutional right. Post-
Hosanna-Tabor, a few Catholics succeeded in their lawsuits while 
numerous others failed. A few non-Catholics or purely lay Catholic 
teachers have not yet been treated as ministers at Catholic schools.88 
Technically, Hosanna-Tabor only affirmed what other courts had been 
doing since 1972.89 But what it did was very serious. It gave institutional 
churches the right to fire many employees and robs those employees of 
any legal right to sue their employers. As with many religious freedom 
rules, the general protection goes to institutions over religious 
individuals. In practice, the Court’s rule protected the institutional 
administrators and not the individual members. 
The chain of events associated with arguing the ministerial exception 
is perplexing, especially for female plaintiffs. After a woman files a 
lawsuit alleging discrimination, a religious employer will likely claim 
First Amendment protection, arguing the employee’s lawsuit must be 
dismissed because she is a minister. This defense is puzzling to many 
employees. In many cases, the employee knows her hierarchical 
employer does not ordain women. She is a schoolteacher, principal, or 
nurse, and never a priest. The court explains that whether she is a 
minister, or not, is a theological question that courts cannot resolve.90 The 
employee finds out that she does not possess any employment rights 
because her employer has just ordained her under a theory of religious 
freedom called either the “ministerial exception” or the “ecclesiastical 
abstention” theory of the First Amendment. 
The woman whose church ordains women and preaches their equality 
with men fares no better. Her lawsuits for equal pay, gender 
discrimination, and pregnancy discrimination are all dismissed because 
she is an actual minister or priest. She is at least as puzzled as the non-
 
87. See generally Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2014); Kirby 
v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014). 
88. See generally Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. 
Ind. 2014), appeal dismissed, 772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014); Bohnert v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of S.F., 136 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., No. 
NOCV2014-751, 2015 WL 9682042 (Mass. Supp. Dec. 16, 2015). 
89. See note 74, supra. 
90. See, e.g., Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-S. Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2003). 
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ordained woman. Why is an employer that believes in women’s equality 
and ordains women allowed to fire or demote her when she is pregnant, 
or to pay her less, or treat her less fairly, than equally qualified males? 
The list of post-Hosanna-Tabor cases is very long. For example, 
Christa Dias, a non-Catholic, lesbian technology coordinator at Holy 
Family School and St. Lawrence School in the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 
Ohio, was initially fired for becoming pregnant outside of marriage, and 
then for using artificial insemination to become pregnant.91 Dias was able 
to win a jury verdict because she was non-Catholic and therefore not a 
Catholic minister.92 Emily Herx, a South Bend schoolteacher, was 
allowed to win a jury verdict for gender discrimination for using in vitro 
fertilization.93 As in those cases, a few non-Catholics or purely lay 
Catholic teachers have not been dismissed as ministers at Catholic 
schools.94 Alexandria Kelley, a maintenance and childcare employee at 
Decatur Baptist Church, was fired because she was pregnant and 
unmarried.95 Because of her job duties, however, the court was unable to 
declare her a minister.96 
Many Catholic women, however, have had their lawsuits dismissed 
even though their church never ordains women, making it implausible 
that women employees are actually ministers. The Second Circuit 
recently ruled that a Catholic laywoman, who was principal of a Catholic 
parochial school, was a minister.97 That court also ruled that New York 
Methodist Hospital was a religious institution, even though it had a long 
history of emphasizing its secular identity.98 Therefore, Marlon Penn, a 
chaplain there, was fired on racial grounds with no lawsuit.99 And here in 
the Seventh Circuit, recently a Jewish schoolteacher who argued that 
 
91. Ohio Jury Rules in Favor of Mom Who Was Fired by Catholic Archdiocese for Using 
Artificial Insemination, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/national/jury-rules-favor-ohio-mom-fired-catholic-archdiocese-artificial-insemination-
article-1.1363923. 
92. Id. 
93. Herx, 772 F.3d at 1086. 
94. See Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165, at *8 (S.D. 
Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (finding that Christa Dias, a non-Catholic technology coordinator at a Catholic 
school, is not a minister); Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. 
Ind. 2014), appeal dismissed, 772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014); Bohnert v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of S.F., 136 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., No. 
NOCV2014-751, 2015 WL 9682042 (Mass. Supp. Dec. 16, 2015) (allowing all three lawsuits to 
proceed). 
95. Kelley v. Decatur Baptist Church, No. 5:17-CV-1239-HNJ, 2018 WL 2130433, at *1 (N.D. 
Ala., May 9, 2018). 
96. Id. at *5. 
97. Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 209 (2d Cir. 2017). 
98. Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 884 F.3d 416, 419, 425–26 (2d Cir. 2018). 
99. Id. at 421. 
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teaching about Judaism at a Jewish school was cultural and historical, not 
religious, lost her case because the court said she too was a minister.100 
Father John Gallagher was a Catholic priest who exposed some of his 
church’s sexual abuse. He sued his diocese for defamation in its news 
articles, letters, press, and media statements.101 Although the trial court 
voted to hear his case, the appeals court reversed.102 Evelyn Kelly’s 
defamation, negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, and age and sex 
discrimination lawsuit against St. Luke’s Methodist Church was also 
dismissed.103 
There are numerous other cases across the country by LGBT 
employees, or music employees, fired for their marriages or relationships, 
including Sandor Demkovich, John Colin Collette, and Stanislaw 
Sterlinski, who in this area unsuccessfully sued the Archdiocese of 
Chicago for their firings, having their age, disability, and other 
discrimination lawsuits dismissed.104 
Professor Caroline Mala Corbin has repeatedly reminded her readers 
that the law offers a clearer, better approach, namely to 
apply employment discrimination law to a religious employer in the 
same way it would be applied to a secular employer. . . . To start, if the 
religion condemns discrimination, then applying antidiscrimination law 
does not impose a substantial burden. Furthermore, even if the religion 
advocates discrimination or retaliation, the government’s interest in 
protecting employees might outweigh the church’s.105 
The same argument applies to all these legal cases. Some employees 
would win their cases; others would lose. But the facts would be in the 
record instead of hidden behind the ministerial title. 
The same rules should apply to contraception, the subject of Part III. 
 
100. Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch. Inc., 260 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1061 (E.D. Wis. 
2017). 
101. Diocese of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Gallagher, 249 So. 3d 657, 660–61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2018). 
102. Id. at 665. 
103. Kelly v. St. Luke Cmty. United Methodist Church, No. 05-16-01171-CV, 2018 WL 
654907, at *11 (Tex. App. Feb. 1, 2018). 
104. See generally Collette v. Archdiocese of Chi., 200 F. Supp. 3d 730 (N.D. Ill. 2016); 
Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, No. 1:16-cv-11576, 2017 WL 4339817 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 29, 2017); Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 203 F. Supp. 3d 908 (N.D. Ill. 2016); see 
also Ginalski v. Diocese of Gary, No. 2:15-CV-95-PRC, 2016 WL 7100558 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 
2016) (Plaintiff Mary Beth Ginalski, as principal of a Catholic school, was considered a minister 
when she brought a case for sex, age, and disability discrimination.); Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran 
Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668, 674 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Catholic schoolteacher filed a suit alleging age, 
sex, and marital status discrimination, who the court found to be a minister due to her status as a 
“called teacher” regardless of her secular duties). 
105. Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 970 (2012). 
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III.  CONTRACEPTION AND REPRODUCTIVE ACCESS 
The story of women’s legal contraceptive access in the United States 
is anything but straight. One narrative, however, has not changed over the 
last century. The United States’ Roman Catholic bishops have 
consistently opposed contraception. Their steady opposition and recent 
legal victories limiting contraception suggest that the government and the 
church have misunderstood the nature of religious freedom. 
The bishops’ first joint public statement against contraception 
appeared in 1919, when they went public to counter the successes of 
Margaret Sanger’s birth control movement.106 Since then, their 
opposition to contraceptive access has been nonstop. Many Catholics 
thought church teaching against contraception would change in 1968, 
when a papal commission recommended that church teaching should 
transform and allow contraception.107 Pope Paul VI ignored his 
committee’s ruling. Instead, he released Humanae Vitae, the 1968 
encyclical letter that reiterated the church’s traditional ban on artificial 
contraception.108 
Humanae Vitae was greeted with dissent and disobedience by lay 
Catholics, who then and now use contraceptives in numbers similar to 
other religious and nonreligious American women.109 Nonetheless, 
American Catholic officials rely on the encyclical to block individual 
Catholics from making their own decisions about contraceptive use. The 
bishops’ lobbying against and public criticism of the contraceptive 
mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires employer 
health plans to offer preventive reproductive care coverage, forced 
Obama administration officials into a series of accommodations that 
gutted contraceptive coverage.110 
The bishops successfully characterized their efforts against the ACA 
as a battle for religious freedom rather than against reproductive 
rights.111 As I noted when the ACA was new: 
 
106. LESLIE WOODCOCK TENTLER, CATHOLICS AND CONTRACEPTION: AN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 40–41 (2004) (describing John A. Ryan’s letter condemning contraception). 
107. Russell Shaw, Church Birth Control Commission Docs Unveiled, OSV NEWSWEEKLY 
(Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.osv.com/OSVNewsweekly/Story/TabId/2672/ArtMID/13567/ 
ArticleID/2023/Church-birth-control-commission-docs-unveiled.aspx. 
108. See generally Humanae Vitae, supra note 48. 
109. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 49. 
110. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001, et seq. 
(2012). 
111. See generally Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers 
Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
75 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (July 19, 2010) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 
C.F.R. pt. 147); Office of the General Counsel Letter, Re: Interim Final Rules Relating to Coverage 
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Through litigation they worked in conjunction with a broad range of 
Catholic institutions—universities, colleges, dioceses, hospitals, and 
parishes—that buttressed their religious freedom argument. This [group 
of associations] allowed them to achieve legal and political success 
even though a majority of their membership—i.e., individual 
Catholics—continues to use contraception as well as support 
contraceptive access for [all individuals].112 
When President Obama originally introduced his health insurance 
plan, the bishops orchestrated a sustained campaign of public 
appearances, lobbied in Congress, commented on the regulatory process, 
and pursued extensive litigation to abolish the contraceptive mandate. 
Although the ACA was supposed to provide reproductive care for 
everyone, Obama originally offered churches an exemption from the 
reproductive preventive services requirement.113 The initial reason for 
the exemption was that everyone in a church agrees about the morality of 
contraception. Completely unnoticed by both church and state was that 
most Catholics dissent from their church’s teaching on contraception and 
use it whenever they can.114 The bishops were unhappy with Obama’s 
original exemption. As I noted when Obama’s original exemption was 
articulated: 
The bishops’ desired exemption would include not only religious and 
secular nonprofit and for-profit employers, but also individual 
employees who did not want to participate in an insurance plan that 
sponsored contraceptive coverage. . . .  
 In exempting employees as well as employers, [the Catholic] 
proposal undermined the whole structure of the ACA, which depends 
on having all insureds in the insurance pool.115 
The bishops also sponsored a litigation series that aided employers not 
covered by the exemption.116  
 
of Preventive Services (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/contraception/upload/regarding-interim-final-rules-relating-to-coverage-of-preventetive-
services.pdf. 
112. Leslie C. Griffin, The Catholic Bishops vs. the Contraceptive Mandate, 2015 RELIGIONS 
1411, 1412 (2015). 
113. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 
3, 2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); 45 C.F.R. § 
147.131(a) (2017). 
114. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 49 (finding that only two percent of sexually active 
Catholic women, including those who attend church service monthly, depend on natural family 
planning methods). 
115. Griffin, supra note 112, at 1421; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519, 548 (2012) (“In addition, the mandate forces into the insurance risk pool more healthy 
individuals, whose premiums on average will be higher than their health care expenses.”). 
116. See, e.g., Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012), held in 
abeyance sub nom. Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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Belmont Abbey College, a Benedictine college in North Carolina, filed 
the first lawsuit challenging the regulations as a violation of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the First Amendment, and 
the Administrative Procedures Act. The college and the government 
agreed that the college was not exempt from the mandate “because it 
employs and serves many individuals who do not share its religious 
values and because it is not a church and does not otherwise qualify as 
an organization described in the relevant sections of the IRS Code.” But 
the college argued it should be exempt. Other [institutional] lawsuits by 
religious nonprofits soon followed. . . .  
. . . . 
 The president’s sensitivity to the bishops’ concerns affected the 
litigation of the mandate. In court, the government argued that it was 
considering accommodations for religious nonprofits like Belmont 
Abbey. The [nonprofit] legal cases were put on hold while [the 
Department of Health and Human Services] (HHS) and the Obama 
administration reconsidered their accommodation options . . . .117  
Obama even met with New York Archbishop Timothy Dolan and other 
critics of the mandate.118 
While the nonprofit cases were on hold, the religious for-profit cases 
continued. Those cases culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, where the Court ruled five to four that religious 
for-profits were entitled to a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
exemption from the contraceptive mandate.119 The Hobby Lobby 
plaintiffs opposed only four of twenty contraceptives because they 
believed they were abortifacient.120 But, the opinion set a strong 
precedent for all opposition to contraception. The bishops voiced support 
for Hobby Lobby, which was consistent with their goals to restrict the 
contraceptive mandate wherever possible.121 
The bishops remained unhappy when HHS released details of the 
accommodation that had been promised at the beginning of the 
nonprofits’ litigation.122 The government offered an accommodation 
 
117. Griffin, supra note 112, at 1421 (citations omitted). 
118. Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Open ‘Religious Liberty’ Drive, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), 
at A14. 
119. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d, 723 
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2759 (2014). 
120. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
121. Archbishop Joseph E. Kurtz & Archbishop William E. Lori, USCCB Statement on 
Supreme Court “Hobby Lobby” Decision, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/hhs-mandate/usccb-hobby-lobby-case-
statement-june-2014.cfm. 
122. See HHS Final Rule Still Requires Action in Congress, by Courts, Says Cardinal Dolan, 
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while the bishops wanted a complete exemption.  
The regulations proposed that nonprofit entities that held themselves 
out as religious organizations and had religious objections to 
contraceptive services could request the new accommodation. Each of 
the newly-accommodated organizations would have to “self-certify” to 
its insurer that it qualified for the accommodation and list what services 
it opposed. Self-certification [allegedly] protects religious liberty 
because it keeps the government from deciding who qualifies for the 
accommodation by parsing through the entity’s beliefs. HHS offered an 
accommodation and not an exemption because, [they believed that,] 
unlike the churches, the nonprofits’ employees were “less likely . . . to 
share such religious objections of the eligible organizations. . . .” 
 Once the self-certification was in the insurer’s hand, the insurance 
company “would assume sole responsibility, independent of the eligible 
organization and its plan, for providing contraceptive coverage without 
cost sharing, premium, fee, or other charge to plan participants and 
beneficiaries.”123  
The Obama administration saw this accommodation as a means for 
employees to receive contraception while their employers’ conscience 
was protected. The bishops, however, had another perspective. They 
refused accommodation no matter what form it took—sign here, notify 
there, distance yourself from your insurance carrier everywhere—
because exemption was the real goal. The government found itself in 
constant negotiations with nonprofits that would not compromise, 
negotiating against itself by offering various accommodating alternatives 
while the nonprofits just said no. 
Eventually, seven of eight United States courts of appeals rejected the 
plaintiffs’ arguments that the notification provisions of the 
accommodation substantially burdened plaintiffs’ religion under the 
RFRA. Once the Eighth Circuit ruled for the plaintiffs, however, there 
was a circuit split.124 The circuit split persuaded the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari in Zubik v. Burwell.125 The Court decided to hear seven 
nonprofit contraceptive cases from four different courts of appeals.126 
 
U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (July 3, 2013), http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-137.cfm 
(expressing concern about the religious ministries’ level of “accommodation” under the exemption 
for those excluded from the definition of “religious employers”). 
123. Griffin, supra note 112, at 1424 (citations omitted) (referencing Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8462 (Feb. 6, 2013)). 
124. See generally Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:12-
CV-92-DDN, 2013 WL 6858588 (E.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated sub 
nom. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. CNS Int’l Ministries, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 
(U.S. May 16, 2016). 
125. See generally Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
126. See id. at 1560 (vacating judgments and remanding cases in the DC, Third, Fifth, and Tenth 
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Zubik hit the Court, however, after Justice Antonin Scalia had died. In 
an eight-justice per curiam opinion, the Court remanded the seven cases 
to the lower courts, asking the parties to come to their own resolution of 
the problem.127 In particular, the Court did not decide the RFRA issues 
of “whether petitioners’ religious exercise ha[d] been substantially 
burdened, whether the Government ha[d] a compelling interest, or 
whether the current regulations [were] the least restrictive means of 
serving that interest.”128 Instead, according to the Court, “the parties on 
remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going 
forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the 
same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 
‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive 
coverage.’”129 
Officially, protecting both employers and employees had always been 
the goal of the negotiations between church and state. The Court’s 
optimistic remand, however, quickly failed. By January 9, 2017, over 
54,000 public comments were posted on the lawsuit’s website about a 
possible compromise.130 The website’s repeated and disagreeing 
comments, which merely restated everything that had already been 
litigated in the courts, eventually persuaded the government to notify the 
courts that agreement was impossible. The Obama administration 
concluded, based on the 54,000 comments, that “no feasible approach has 
been identified at this time that would resolve the concerns of religious 
objectors, while still ensuring that the affected women receive full and 
equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.”131 On January 
10, 2017, the Department of Justice’s attorneys filed a brief in the DC 
Circuit reporting the effort’s failure.132 The government’s move allowed 
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the self-certification rules to the health insurance issuer, third-party 
administrator, or HHS to remain in place for the time being. 
The Trump administration made the institution’s exemption, not the 
individual’s right, even broader and easier for contraceptive opponents to 
claim. After the president announced “we will not allow people of faith 
to be targeted, bullied or silenced anymore,” Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions ordered that federal employees support the position that 
“workers, employers and organizations may claim broad exemptions 
from nondiscrimination laws on the basis of religious objections.”133 
Some journalists suggest that hundreds of thousands of women will lose 
their contraceptive benefits under this new policy.134 Sessions also ruled 
that “sex” in the Civil Rights Act did not include transgender people, and 
that LGBTs did not need full legal protection, thus cutting back on 
antidiscrimination rights.135 
Under the United States Constitution and Griswold v. Connecticut,136 
choosing to use contraception—or not—is first the individual woman’s 
moral, religious, and constitutional right. Nonetheless, all three branches 
of the federal government, plus many states, back the religion’s decision 
to block its employees from contraception, whether they want or do not 
want to use it.137 The courts and the administrations have ruled for the 
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hierarchy of a church even when its members do not support the 
hierarchy. Today, in Catholic places, even bad Catholics, former 
Catholics, and non-Catholics lose most of the right to contraception the 
courts originally gave them as individuals. 
This subject, contraception, does not even take into account the 
tremendous influence of Catholic hospitals, which are growing more 
predominant in American health care every year, and the effects of that 
number on reproductive health.138 There was a “22 percent increase 
in . . . Catholic hospitals between 2001 and 2016.”139 One in six 
Americans now receives care at a Catholic hospital.140  
By 2016, [a] study found, 14.5 percent of all U.S. acute care hospitals 
were Catholic, including 10 of the 25 largest health care systems in the 
country. In some states with fewer hospitals, Catholic providers are a 
dominant presence in the market. In five states (Alaska, Iowa, 
Washington, Wisconsin, and South Dakota), more than 40 percent of 
acute care beds were Catholic-owned or -affiliated in 2016.141 
The effect on reproductive health care is strong: “Catholic hospitals 
reduce the per-bed annual rates of inpatient abortions by 30 percent, and 
tubal ligations, or sterilization, by 31 percent.”142 They limit reproductive 
care in the same way many religious organizations strive to limit the 
constitutional right to marry, the subject of Part IV. 
IV.  THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
Despite long, bitter, religious, Bible-based opposition to interracial 
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marriage, the unanimous Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia143 did not 
even hint at religious exemptions for racial discrimination, and state and 
federal legislatures did not enact them.144 In contrast, four dissenting 
Justices in three separate Obergefell v. Hodges dissents fretted about the 
impact of same-sex marriage equality on religious freedom.145 Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel Alito, and the 
late Justice Antonin Scalia all raised questions promoting religion’s rights 
to oppose or block same-sex marriage.146 
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that “same-sex 
couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex 
couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their 
personhood to deny them this right.”147 For that reason, Kennedy rejected 
religion-based marriage laws. According to Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, 
Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion 
based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and 
neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, 
personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the 
necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an 
exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is 
then denied.148 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion also recognized the First Amendment 
speech right that allows same-sex marriage critics to voice their 
opposition to the practice.149  
In contrast, the four dissenters (Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito) emphasized the religious view of heterosexual monogamy and its 
decisiveness for marriage law.150 Thus, only one justice’s vote spared the 
country from continued LGBT discrimination relating to marriage. The 
dissenters believed that the right to exercise religion was at risk from 
Kennedy’s reasoning.151 All four dissenters suggested that religion must 
play a greater role in the marriage laws.152 
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The extensive reaction to Obergefell demonstrates how complex the 
relationship of religion to the state is under current law. Marriage 
opponents have proposed and/or passed all kinds of legislation that grants 
them conscience rights to deny LGBT marriage, in one form or 
another.153 
LGBT couples face numerous threats of not being married by some 
clerks and being denied everything connected with marriage, from cakes 
to flowers and food, wedding dresses, and a place to hold their weddings. 
Religious opponents of same-sex marriage defended their right not to 
provide commercial services for same-sex weddings. These situations 
include the refusals of florists to provide flowers;154 bakers to bake 
cakes;155 photographers to take pictures;156 bed and breakfasts, 
innkeepers, and wedding halls to rent facilities;157 and catering 
companies to provide food. Government and commercial employees have 
repeatedly asked for exemptions from marriage services or products.158 
Many states exempt their employees from dealing with gay marriages. 
One state said individuals, in their words,  
shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, goods or privileges to an individual if the request for such 
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services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges is 
related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage 
and such solemnization or celebration is in violation of their religious 
beliefs and faith.159  
Those exemptions freed the organizations from civil suits and 
government penalties (including fines and loss of tax exemptions) for 
refusal to comply with the same-sex marriage laws. 
Confronted with these situations of businesses that choose to 
discriminate, many states debated using their RFRAs and other statutes 
to codify the right to discriminate as a matter of religious freedom. A 
group of prominent law professors even drafted a Marriage Conscience 
Protection Act that, among other things, freed religious associations from 
“treat[ing] as valid any marriage.”160 The “treat as valid any marriage” 
language takes the exemption “far outside the marriage [ceremony] 
context and permit[s] discrimination against same-sex couples 
throughout the life of their (marital) relationships,”161 thereby limiting 
the same-sex couples’ rights “during the entire course of a relationship, 
from food and shelter to healthcare and legal representation.”162 Second, 
that section not only prohibits LGBT couples from suing organizations 
under the antidiscrimination laws but also prohibits any government 
penalties “including but not limited to laws regarding employment 
discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational 
institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt 
status.”163 
The Supreme Court recently decided a First Amendment case brought 
by a cake baker, Jack Phillips, from Masterpiece Cakeshop who does not 
believe in gay marriage and refused to bake a cake when a gay couple 
told him they were getting married.164 That is illegal sexual orientation 
discrimination under Colorado law, and state actors there repeatedly ruled 
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for the couple.165 
Most commentators expected the Court to decide the case on free 
speech grounds. Instead, in a seven to two opinion, the Court surprisingly 
ruled that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had violated the baker’s 
free exercise rights by not meeting the norm of religious neutrality and 
instead treating him with religious hostility.166 The Court overruled the 
Colorado courts’ conclusion that the Court’s famous free exercise 
decision, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, required 
the baker to follow the neutral and general sexual orientation 
discrimination laws.167 
Justice Kennedy’s evidence of the Commission’s “clear and 
impermissible hostility toward the [baker’s] sincere religious beliefs” 
was weak.168 His reasoning was consistent with the Court’s trend of being 
too positive toward religion, as it was when it ruled against civil rights in 
Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby. In a first Commission meeting, 
Kennedy wrote, 
One commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe “what he wants 
to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he decides to do 
business in the state.” A few moments later, the commissioner restated 
the same position: “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the state 
and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his personal belief 
system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.”169 
That statement is not hostile to religion. It displays a commissioner 
commenting on the actual state of free exercise law, which is supposed 
to mean that everyone must obey the law despite personal preferences. 
Instead, Justice Kennedy concluded that the comments were 
“inappropriate and dismissive.”170 He made similar comments about a 
second meeting, where one commissioner said: 
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last 
meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all 
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, 
whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list 
hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to 
justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces 
of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.171 
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That statement is sad, but true. Nonetheless, Kennedy characterized it 
as unfairly hostile to religion. Only two dissenters disagreed with his 
analysis.172 Thus, Masterpiece reflects the Court’s ongoing preference 
for religious freedom over antidiscrimination rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Imagine if, instead, the Court preferred individuals to organizations. 
That Court would allow individuals to get into court for employment 
discrimination lawsuits. It would ensure they got contraception. It would 
protect their right to marry against discrimination. 
Ideally, with its Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the 
Constitution mandates secular laws that apply to everyone, without 
religious exception.173 According to Smith, the leading Free Exercise 
decision, “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 
religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”174 The Establishment Clause is 
supposed to ban religion-based government. 
Yet, even with Smith on the books, the Court nonetheless ruled that the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses require the 
ministerial exception. Moreover, Congress also undermined Smith by 
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which the courts have 
strongly enforced. Under RFRA, neutral laws that substantially burden 
religion are invalidated unless the government can prove it used the least 
restrictive means to reach a compelling interest to pass those laws.175 
That very demanding test provides a big advantage to institutions over 
individuals. Both the Hobby Lobby and the Zubik plaintiffs enjoyed their 
greatest success under RFRA.176 Finally, Smith was undermined with the 
Court’s free exercise decision in Masterpiece, which found religious 
hostility where none existed. 
On the Court, it is unlikely that anything about religion will change 
any time soon. Justice Neil Gorsuch, who replaced Justice Antonin Scalia 
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on the Supreme Court, may share the late justice’s views of law and 
religion. Gorsuch joined the seven-justice majority in Masterpiece.177 In 
the Tenth Circuit’s en banc version of Hobby Lobby,178 then-Judge 
Gorsuch wrote a strong opinion concluding that the Greens had already 
won their case. According to Gorsuch, RFRA “doesn’t just apply to 
protect popular religious beliefs: it does perhaps its most important work 
in protecting unpopular religious beliefs, vindicating this nation’s long-
held aspiration to serve as a refuge of religious tolerance.”179 Gorsuch 
sternly disagreed with his colleagues who had found no substantial 
burden on the Greens’ religion.180 Gorsuch also joined his dissenting 
colleagues in his court’s other contraceptive case, Little Sisters of the 
Poor v. Burwell.181 
Newer-Justice Brett Kavanaugh has also been praised as a “warrior for 
religious liberty.”182 Although his DC Circuit colleague, Judge Nina 
Pillard, wrote an opinion dismissing a RFRA case against the 
contraceptive insurance requirement of the Affordable Care Act, Judge 
Kavanaugh dissented from the court’s refusal to rehear the case en 
banc.183 Kavanaugh wrote in that dissent that following Hobby Lobby and 
other Supreme Court cases, he would have ruled for the anti-
contraception plaintiffs.184 As a judge and as an advocate, he has also 
participated in several pro-prayer cases.185 He too is expected to be a pro-
religion Supreme Court justice.  
Many people are happy with this situation, just as, in Murray’s era, 
most Catholics opposed the morality and legality of the First 
Amendment. They might not care that current law harms numerous 
individuals who are trying to live a religious or moral life. The present 
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should remind us why Murray concluded as he did, against his own 
church’s teaching, that all individuals, not just Catholic institutions, have 
the right to religious freedom.186 If we listen to him, we might realize that 
people of different faiths need to find political common ground even 
while agreeing to disagree about theology. The law protects women’s 
rights, reproductive rights, and gay and lesbian rights. It should be up to 
individuals, not their church’s hierarchy, to decide whether to exercise 
those rights. Further, civil rights law needs to be set by the state, not by 
the state at the direction of the church. 
Against all odds, the Roman Catholic Church accepted Murray’s 
thought. He still provides an example to follow. He is a great model of 
slowly effectuating change in favor of rights in a rights-unfriendly world. 
Just as Murray fought successfully for religious freedom, today women, 
gays, lesbians, and transgender people need to convince both church and 
state that they have rights. 
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